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Abstract  
Using a Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) model, this study examines the effects 
of monetary policy in economies where minimum wages are bound. The findings 
show that the monetary-policy effect on a binding-minimum-wage economy is 
relatively small and quite persistent. This result suggests that these two
characteristics of monetary policy in the minimum-wage model are rather different 
from those in the union-negotiation model which is often assumed to account for 
industrial economies.  
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in Developing Countries with Minimum Wages 
 
Masahiro Kodama 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) model, this study examines the effects of 
monetary policy in economies where minimum wages are bound. The findings show that 
the monetary-policy effect on a binding-minimum-wage economy is relatively small and 
quite persistent. This result suggests that these two characteristics of monetary policy 
in the minimum-wage model are rather different from those in the union-negotiation 
model which is often assumed to account for industrial economies. 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Using a Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) model, this study examines the effects of 
monetary policy in economies where minimum wages are bound. Some researchers have 
already examined monetary-policy effects based on DGE models.  However, the 
assumptions of the models have not reflected the situation in developing countries in 
one important way, that being the effects of a binding minimum wage. 
To have effective monetary policy in an economic model, we often assume some kind 
of price rigidity.  In previous research the negotiation of wages between a union and a 
company is typically assumed as an explanation of such rigidity.  A wage level is 
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negotiated, and once agreed on, that level is fixed for a certain period of time.  After 
that period, negotiations are undertaken again to set a new wage level.  The wage level 
under this system is not completely flexible, and while reflecting, for example, the U.S. 
wage determination process, this system does not depict the wage determining process 
in developing countries.  In these countries workers are often paid at the 
minimum-wage level, most often because the supply of labor in these countries is much 
larger than the labor demand. As a result the market-level wage goes down.  Even if a 
country has a system of minimum wages, the market-level wage adjusts lower than the 
minimum-wage level.  Thus in a developing country the minimum wage binds, and it is 
the level that is paid to workers. 
Given this situation, in order to understand the effects of monetary policy in 
developing countries, we need to construct a new model with a binding minimum wage.  
In this paper we construct such a model and compare the monetary-policy effect in the 
model to the effect in a model with union-negotiation assumptions.  Through this 
comparison, this study will show how monetary policy affects economies with binding 
minimum wages. 
 
 
2.1. The Union-Negotiation Model 
Based on Benassy (1995), the following model is used as a union-negotiation model. C, 
M, P, N, I, K and Z represent consumption, money, price level, labor, investment, capital, 
and technology, respectively.  N  is the total amount of time an agent has.  Thus 
NN −  represents leisure time. 
The utility of the agent over time is expressed as 
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One of the features of the utility function is that it includes M, money.  Budget 
constraints include M corresponding to money in the utility function. 
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To express money growth, we use the usual assumption: 
1−= ttt MM μ .                                                                (3) 
Later we will assume a probability process for M.  Therefore this expression will be 
replaced by 
)(0,～        whereloglog 2, , 1 mtmtmtt NMM σεε+= − .                               (4) 
The production side is written as 
αα −=  1  tttt NKZY                                                             (5) 
tt IK =+1                                                                     (6) 
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The market clearing condition is 
ttt ICY += .                                                                (8) 
 
 
2.2. Necessary Conditions under Wage Stickiness 
In this union-negotiation model we assume the typical wage stickiness presented in the 
literature.  As the period of the previously negotiated wage level is closing, workers 
negotiate with the firm for a new wage level.  Forecasting the equilibrium amount of 
labor in the new period, both sides seek an agreement on the wage level in the new 
period.  Once they have come to an agreement, the firm can hire as much labor as it 
wants at the new wage level.  At the end of the period, the wage level is renegotiated 
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for the next period.  
Having adopted this wage stickiness, we need a labor demand equation and a labor 
supply equation.  We derive the first order conditions for the consumer and the firm 
separately. 
The consumer’s Lagrangean and FOCs can be written as 
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 The producer’s profit function and FOCs are 
ttt
t
t
tttt KrNP
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ααα −−= 1 1 tttt NKZr                                                          (15) 
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t
t NKZ
P
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(11) and (16) are the labor supply equation and the labor demand equation, respectively. 
Other original conditions are 
1−= ttt MM μ .                                                              (17) 
αα −=  1  tttt NKZY                                                           (18) 
tt IK =+1                                                                   (19) 
)(0, ～       whereloglog 2, , 1 ztztztzt NZZ σεερ += −                               (20) 
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ttt ICY += .                                                               (21) 
These are the usual necessary conditions.  Since we are assuming wage stickiness, as 
mentioned above, some equations can be replaced.  But before doing this, we will 
simplify some equations. 
From equations (10), (12), (15), (18) and (21), we can derive 
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Eliminating the explosion of variables and combining with (21), we have 
tt YC )1( αβ−=                                                              (22) 
tt YI αβ=  .                                                                (23) 
We can now solve a system of equations, composed of the labor demand equation (16) 
and labor supply equation (11), for the expected equilibrium labor amount.  By using 
(10), (18), and (22) we can simplify the result as 
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The solution includes parameters only.  Therefore the expected amount of labor is a 
constant.  Substituting (24) into (16) and taking the logs of both sides, we can show 
that 
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In our assumption the wage level is determined at the end of the previous period.  
Therefore equation (25) is replaced with 
vnmEw ttt −−−+= − )1log()(1 α .                                              (26) 
Now we have all the necessary conditions for solving the problem.  They are (10), (12), 
(13), (15), (16), (17)~(21), and (26).  Notice that labor supply equation (11) is not 
included.  (11) has been embodied in (24). 
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2.3. Log-linearization 
In this section we log-linearize the set of necessary conditions.  The variables with a 
tilde are defined as 
XXx tt loglog −≡
～
    where X  is the steady state value of  . tX
The results of the log-linearization of the conditions are as follows:   
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2.4. Steady State 
From the set of necessary conditions, (10), (12), (13), (15), (16), (17)~(21), and (26), we 
can derive the steady state values of the variables. 
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3. The Minimum-Wage Model 
Basically the model is the same as the union-negotiation model.  But the following 
points are different.  There is no negotiation through unions.  The wage level is set at 
the market level determined by labor demand and supply; or if the market-level wage is 
lower than the minimum wage, the minimum wage is paid.  In this paper the latter 
case is assumed, that the minimum wage binds. 
WW =   where W  is the minimum wage.                                     (27) 
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Regarding log-linearization, the equations are almost the same as those in the 
union-negotiation model.  In the set of log-linearized equations in the 
union-negotiation model, we only need to replace (28) with (29). 
1
~~
−= tt mw                                                                     (28) 
~ 0=tw                                                                       (29) 
We can now log-linearize.  In the union-negotiation model, (11) is the labor supply 
function.  In the minimum wage model, (27) is that function.  Since (16) is the labor 
demand function, by combining (16) and (27), we can solve for labor in the 
minimum-wage model.  Using the combination of (22) and (18) and the combination of 
(10), (13), and (17) in order to eliminate Z and K in (16), we have the steady state level N 
in the minimum wage model. 
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The other steady state variables can be obtained by replacing N* in the steady state of 
the union negotiation model with N**. 
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4. Simulation Result 
By applying a Blanchard-Kahn (1980) form to the log-linearized necessary conditions, 
we can obtain equations which can be used to simulate the model.  The values of the 
parameters come from King and Rebelo (2000).   
 
Table 1. Parameters 
α β γ N  M 2zσ  
0.58 0.988 3.48 1 1 1 
 
 
Fixing these parameters changes the values of σ 2m and θ .  The results of the 
simulation are shown in Table 2, Figure 1 and Figure 2.  Note that all the lowercase 
variables represent growth rates, not level amounts.   
 
  
Table 2. Correlations of m and Other Variables 
 corr(m,y) corr(m,ｃ) corr(m,i) corr(m,p) corr(m,w-p) 
U 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.31 -0.31 2Mσ = 1 
θ= 0.1 M 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.04 -0.04 
 
U 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.22 -0.22 2Mσ =0.5 
θ= 0.1 M 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 -0.03 
 
U 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.10 -0.10 2Mσ =0.1 
θ= 0.1 M 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.01 
 
U 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.37 -0.37 2Mσ = 1 
θ= 0.2 M 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.09 -0.09 
 
U 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.45 -0.45 2Mσ = 1 
θ= 0.5 M 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.25 -0.25 
* U and M indicate the union-negotiation model and the minimum-wage model,respectively. 
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Table 2 shows that the smaller  is, the less effective monetary policy is.  But 
this is not necessarily so.  In correlation, the magnitude of monetary policy would not 
be so important.  Even if the policy’s magnitude were small, if the direction of change 
in an economic variable were the same as the direction of change in the policy variable, 
the correlation between these two variables could be larger.  The situation of a smaller 
correlating with a less effective monetary policy would mean that the balance of 
monetary policy and productivity shock is important.  If the productivity shock were 
large, then monetary policy would have to be large to be effective. 
2
Mσ
2
Mσ
Moreover, from Table 2 we can say that the correlation between monetary policy and 
other variables is much larger in the union-negotiation model than in the 
minimum-wage model in terms of absolute value.  Naturally the question is: why do we 
have this difference?  The answer can be seen in the figures of the impulse response 
functions.  Note again that all the lowercase variables represent growth rates, not a 
level amounts.  In Figure 2 and Figure 3 we assume that monetary policy is executed 
in period 1. 
It is easy to see that the diagrams in Figures 2 and 3 are quite different, even 
though the difference in the assumptions is only one thing: the determination process of 
wages.  Let us start with the interpretation of the figures for p.  In case of the 
union-negotiation model, p only increases while in the minimum-wage model, it goes up 
and down.  This is because in the case of the former, the wage level is re-set at the 
beginning of the next period.  So if there is any monetary shock in the preceding period, 
the shock would have an impact on the next period’s wage level. 
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions of the Union-Negotiation Model 
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions of the Minimum-Wage Model 
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On the other hand, in the minimum-wage model, wages are fixed at the 
minimum-wage level and do not change even if some monetary shock occurs.  
Therefore p is not pushed up by wages even in the periods following a shock period.  
This difference accounts for the difference in the w-p diagrams.  In the minimum-wage 
w-p diagram, w-p takes only negative numbers.  Remember that w-p is the growth rate 
of W/P.  This means that the level value of W/P, the real wage, only decreases.  w-p in 
the union-negotiation model takes a negative number right after the shock period, but it 
turns positive in the next period.  This means that in the minimum-wage model, a 
monetary shock lowers the real wage indefinitely until there is an opposite monetary 
shock, while in the union-negotiation model, a monetary shock will lower the real wage 
only in the shock period.  This difference is the key to understand the large difference 
between the results of these two model. 
In the minimum-wage model, after a monetary shock, company managers expect 
that the real wage will decline until there is an opposite monetary shock.  Therefore 
they increase the input of labor not only in the shock period but also in the succeeding 
periods.  The continuous expansion of labor demand pushes up the marginal product of 
capital, therefore managers will also invest in the succeeding periods.  As a result, Y 
goes up and raises C.  In case of the union-negotiation model, after a monetary shock, 
company managers expect that the real wage will decline only in the monetary shock 
period.  Therefore they hire a lot of workers in the shock period but not in the future 
periods.  These differences produce rather different results.  Monetary shock in 
union-negotiation model causes large changes in the variables in the shock period, but 
the changes do not persist.  In the minimum wage model, monetary shock dose not 
cause large changes in the variables in the shock period, but the influence of the shock 
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is quite persistent. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this study we examined the effectiveness of monetary policy in the case of a binding 
minimum wage which can often be seen in developing countries.  The results of 
simulations based on a DGE model showed that the monetary-policy effect in a 
binding-minimum-wage economy is relatively small and quite persistent. This finding 
suggests that these characteristics of monetary policy in the minimum-wage model are 
quite different from those in the union-negotiation model which is often assumed to 
account for industrial economies. 
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